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Abstract
We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of 
investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in 
companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private beneﬁts and 
are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased 
transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth 
opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can beneﬁt from 
the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using 
ﬁrm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases 
with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The 
correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor 
protection. 
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1. Introduction
Since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (abbreviated hereafter as 
“LLSV”) established the “law and ﬁnance” ﬁeld in 1998, both academic and practical 
approaches to corporate governance have increasingly focused on the problem of the 
legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders. 
Many studies focus on the consequences of investor protection and find that legal 
protection for investors is associated with many corporate financial issues, such as 
ownership structure (LLSV, 1999), dividend policy (LLSV, 2000), cost of capital 
(Himmelberg et al., 2002), and equity valuation ( LLSV, 2002). As the index of investor 
protection constructed by LLSV is computed at the country level, related empirical 
studies use either cross-country analysis (eg, LLSV, 2000) or time-series analysis (eg, 
Shen et al., 2004). By doing so they imply two assumptions: that ﬁrms in a single legal 
regime are homogenous in their practice of investor protection, and that firm-level 
investor protection is exogenously determined by laws and regulations.1
In contrast to these country-level studies, Duenev and Kim (2005) ﬁnd wide within-
country variation in governance and disclosure practices, with the variation increasing 
as the legal environment becomes less investor friendly. Consistent with Coase (1960), 
such within-country variation reflects firms’ adaptation to poor legal environments. 
Firms with better investment opportunities, a greater need for external financing or 
more concentrated ownership undertake better corporate governance and disclosure.
Based on the Coase theorem, Bergman and Nicolaievslay (2007) suggest that absent 
a strong legal regime, capital suppliers and users should negotiate, agree, and privately 
contract on the eﬃcient level of investor protection. Thus, ﬁrms can contractually “opt 
out” of the law. They find that due to a weak legal regime in Mexico, the ability to 
enforce “precisely ﬁltering contracts” is relatively weak, and only “imprecisely ﬁltering 
contracts” can be well enforced.2 As a result, the legal protection oﬀered to investors 
may induce an over-regulation cost while preventing expropriation or ineﬃciency. In 
this case, private firms tend to offer contracts that are over-inclusive because of low 
renegotiation costs, whereas public ﬁrms tend to oﬀer contracts that are under-inclusive 
because of high renegotiate costs. Recently La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer 
recognized in their new work with Djankov that prior studies have not distinguished 
1 In the law and finance literature, investor protection is the legal protection of minority shareholders and 
creditors against expropriation by corporate insiders. In this paper, unless otherwise noted, “investor” is deﬁned 
as a minority shareholder of a listed company and “protection” is defined as firm-level mechanism and its 
enforcement. 
2 In the Bergman and Nicolaievslay (2007) study, “precisely ﬁltering contracts” provide protection to investors 
only when it is necessary: ie, in the eventualities that expropriation can occur, and only in these eventualities. 
Precisely ﬁltering contracts, therefore, bar expropriation without barring ﬁrms from performing other possibly 
eﬃcient actions. On the contrary, “imprecisely ﬁltering contract” can only bar a kind of action with possible 
expropriation, ie, connected party transaction, without distinguishing the essentiality in investor protection.
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default rules, mandatory rules, and enabling provisions in the law. Firms can opt out 
of default rules and enabling provisions or enhance investor protection by including 
provisions favorable to shareholders in their charters (Djankov et al., 2008). 
The stock market in the People’s Republic of China was established at the beginning 
of 1990s, followed by the gradual development of the legal framework for investor 
protection. The Company Law and Securities Law, which are the core of the legal 
framework that protects investors, were revised in 2005, with eﬀect from 2006. Driven 
by this development of a legal framework, Chinese listed companies have implemented 
investor protection mechanisms. In the Chinese legal system, there are mandatory rules, 
default rules, and enabling provisions. Compared to criminal law, the commercial law 
that regulates investor protection tends to include more default rules and enabling 
provisions. One of the important emendations of the revised Company Law is “taking 
the spirit of company self-regulation, considering the space of participants’ negotiation, 
and extending the application of non-mandatory rules greatly.” (Luo, 2007). Data from 
the Self-Evaluation Report and Rectiﬁcation Plan on Corporate Governance (abbreviated 
as “Self-Evaluation Report” hereafter) provided by Chinese listed companies show that 
there is wide ﬁrm-level variation in the mechanisms of investor protection, especially in 
enforcement provisions (Shen et al., 2009). 
Although the law and finance literature focuses on country-level variation and 
implicitly assumes ﬁrm-level investor protection to be exogenous, it seems reasonable in 
both theoretical and practical terms that the ﬁrm-level legal protection of investors may 
be not only heterogeneous but also endogenous even under identical legal environments. 
If that is the case, why do diﬀerent ﬁrms choose diﬀerent levels of investor protection? 
An exploration of ﬁrm-level investor protection and its determinants will thus be able to 
shed signiﬁcant light on the protection of investors. 
The extent of firm-level investor protection is likely to depend heavily on micro-
level individual contracting in a given legal system within the context of relevant laws. 
We thus present a simple model based on the heterogeneous and exogenous nature 
of firm-level investor protection which suggests that favorable legal protection for 
investors is determined by company attributes in a given legal environment. Controlling 
shareholders perform a trade-off between the gains and losses induced by investor 
protection to maximize their own interests. The benefits of controlling shareholders 
can be categorized as the private beneﬁt of control and the shared beneﬁt of the entire 
equity (Holderness, 2003). Investor protection restrains the private beneﬁt of control 
by increasing the cost of theft and improves the shared benefit by lowering the cost 
of capital and increasing the ability to finance profitable investment opportunities 
(LLSV, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Himmelberg et al., 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998). To maximize their own total beneﬁt, controlling shareholders 
choose the optimal level of investor protection. We use a set of firm-level indices 
for investor protection based on the Self-Evaluation Report and empirically test the 
relationship between investor protection, private benefits of control, and investment 
opportunities.
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model. Section 3 introduces the institutional background in China. Section 4 elaborates 
hypotheses based on the theoretical model and the institutional background. Section 
5 describes the data and variables. Section 6 tests the relationship between investor 
protection, private benefits of control, and investment opportunities. Section 7 
concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical Model
Following LLSV (2002) and Doidge et al. (2004), we present a single-period model 
of an all-equity firm that is fully controlled by a single shareholder. To illustrate the 
tradeoﬀ that determines the level of investor protection, we assume that the controlling 
shareholder has an exogenously determined cash ﬂow or equity ownership of k in the 
firm. If there is no expropriation, the firm will receive an amount of Cash C at the 
end of the period to be shared by all shareholders. However, not all of the cash ﬂow 
is distributed to shareholders on a pro rata basis. As a beneﬁt of controlling the ﬁrm, 
the controlling shareholder diverts a share f of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow C to himself before 
distributing the rest as dividends, given that his ownership is less than 100%. Stealing is 
not free: c is the cost of theft. Under a pyramid or cross-holding ownership arrangement, 
the control structure of the controlling shareholder is complicated and stealing is 
concealed by layers of the control chain and the separation of control rights and cash 
ﬂow rights. An investor protection system, in contrast, makes it diﬃcult for a controlling 
shareholder to steal. We use o to indicate the level of concealment of the control 
structure and p to indicate the level of investor protection. The cost of theft c is related 
to the level of expropriation f. The marginal cost of stealing is positive, and rises as more 
is stolen: ie, cf>0 and cﬀ>0. Stealing is easier with a more complicated control structure 
and costlier with more protective legal regime: that is, co<0, cp>0. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that the cost of theft has a simple functional form that is quadratic 
in f and linearly increasing in p as in line with LLSV (2002) and Doidge et al. (2004): ie, 
 
 
    
 (where b is a constant). Under these assumptions, the controlling shareholder receives
                                          (1)
where the ﬁrst term is the controlling shareholder’s share of after-theft cash ﬂow (the 
shared beneﬁt) and the remaining two terms are his net beneﬁts from expropriation (the 
private beneﬁt of control).
Then, the controlling shareholder chooses f, solving the following maximization 
problem. The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is given by
U = k(1 - f )C + fC -            C,
bf 2 p
2o
c =            C
bf 2 p
2o
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(2)
which can be rewritten as 
                                                      
(3)
We substitute (3) into original maximization problem (1) and obtain the total gain 
of the controlling shareholder,
           
                                    (4)
A higher level of investor protection pH helps to enhance the conﬁdence of outside 
investors, lower the cost of capital, and facilitate external financing. The cash flow 
of the company is thereby improved by z (z>0) through the increase in its ability to 
take advantage of valuable growth opportunities. Following Doidge et al. (2004), for 
simplicity we assume that if the investor protection is only p, the ﬁrm cannot gain access 
to suﬃcient ﬁnancing and take advantage of these growth opportunities. When the level 
of investor protection is improved to pH, the ﬁrm is able to fund proﬁtable opportunities 
and obtain the cash flow (C+z) at the end of the period. As growth opportunities 
increase, so does z. Both the minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder 
can share (C+z). The controlling shareholder, nevertheless, notices that higher-level 
investor protection pH also means the complicated control structure will be discovered 
or will have to be rearranged. Assuming that the level of the concealment of the control 
structure is reduced into (o-x), the cost of theft increases and the private benefit of 
control decreases. Given the change of cash ﬂow, the level of concealment of the control 
structure and the cost of theft, the controlling shareholder must resolve his problem. 
Under the assumption of higher investor protection pH, at the end of the period the cash 
ﬂowing to the controlling shareholder is 
 (5)
The controlling shareholder wants the firm to improve investor protection if (5) 
exceeds (4). Using     to denote for the diﬀerence of (5) and (4), we get
                                (6)
To have the partial derivative:
                                         (7)
                                       
 (8)
U f = - kC +C -              C = 0,
bfp
o
f =
o(1 - k)
bp
U = kC +                C.o(1 - k)
2
2bp
UH = k(C + z) +                      (C + z).(o - x)(1 - k)
2
2bpH
= kz +             (                      -         ).
.
= -                           < 0,
(1 - k)2
2b pH
(o - x)(C + z) oC
p
(1 - k)2
pH2b
(C + z)∂
∂x
(1 - k)2
pH2b
(o - x)= k +                        > 0.∂
∂z
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For second derivative,
(9)
Therefore, the controlling shareholder chooses the level of investor protection to 
maximize his net gains. Other things being equal, controlling shareholders in firms 
with simpler and more transparent control structures have limited opportunities to steal 
so that their private beneﬁt of control is not reduced very much by improvements in 
investor protection. Controlling shareholders in ﬁrms with more complicated control 
structures stand to see their private benefit of control significantly eroded, and thus 
they tend not to improve investor protection. In ﬁrms with more proﬁtable investment 
opportunities and more external ﬁnancing needs, improvements in investor protection 
lower the cost of capital needed to fund investment opportunities and increase the 
shared benefit greatly. Controlling shareholders in these firms thus tend to improve 
investor protection. In firms with few growth opportunities, however, improvements 
in investor protection cannot increase the shared beneﬁt signiﬁcantly through a lower 
cost of capital and higher equity value. In this instance, controlling shareholders have 
less incentive to improve investor protection. To summarize, other things being equal, 
controlling shareholders tend to choose to protect outside shareholders better when the 
control structure is transparent or growth opportunities are better. In the firms with 
both control structure opacity and growth potential, controlling shareholders trade oﬀ 
the losses and gains that will result from improvements in investor protection and decide 
on a moderate level of such protection to maximize their net gains. 
3. Institutional Background
3.1. Stock Market and Corporate Governance in China
The stock market in the People’s Republic China was established as part of an 
ongoing series of reforms. In 1984, the Chinese government shifted the focus of its 
reform of the economic system from the countryside to the cities, at the same time 
launching pilot projects to determine the feasibility of share economy. These pilot 
projects began with collective enterprises and small state-owned businesses and were 
then extended to small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, and ﬁnally to large 
state-owned enterprises.
The initial form of the stock market in China was an over-the-counter transaction 
market launched in Shanghai during 1986, followed by the establishment of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in June 
1991.
Emerging as part of a reform process centered on state-owned enterprises, Chinese 
listed ﬁrms are quite diﬀerent from their peers in developed markets. The equity of these 
= -             < 0.(1 - k)
2
2bpH
∂
∂x∂z
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companies is spilt into public shares, legal person shares, and state-owned shares. Public 
shares are generally held by outside minority investors and are tradable on the stock 
exchange. Legal person shares and state-owned shares, which are generally held by the 
ﬁrm’s promoter, cannot be transferred freely on the exchange. Holders of non-tradable 
shares who control a firm are not consistent with outside minority shareholders in 
interests, which blocks the alignment eﬀect of shareholding. In addition, a typical listed 
firm in China has been spun off from a state-owned enterprise and restructured. Its 
connection with its controlling shareholders thus facilitates an entrenchment eﬀect.
With the development of the Chinese capital market, the ultimate owners of listed 
companies have become diversiﬁed, and include the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) representing the central or local government, 
state-owned enterprises, and private individuals. There are considerable differences 
in acquirement of resources, control structure, and corporate governance between 
companies controlled by state-owned and non-state-owned entities. What should be 
noted particularly are those firms ultimately owned by local government and those 
owned by private individuals. 
In the process of the Chinese government’s economic reforms, local governments 
have acquired increasing power to allocate resources, which gives them the incentive to 
compete with their peers. With the strict control of the approval procedure, company 
listing has become a kind of scarce resource. Local governments compete in terms of 
access to the stock market by helping the companies they control to list. The companies 
subsequently listed are expected to support the regional economy. Given poor property 
protection and ineffective supervision mechanisms, corruption and rent-seeking thus 
arise to a certain extent. Under these circumstances, minority shareholders are likely to 
be exposed to expropriation.
Compared with stated-owned enterprises, listed firms controlled by private 
individuals are in an inferior position. It is diﬃcult for them to acquire ﬁnancing due to 
their small size, weak managerial systems and disadvantageous social capital. Perhaps due 
to the ﬁnancial restraint, these companies typically have more complicated ownership 
structures, such as pyramids or cross-holdings. The separation of control rights and cash 
ﬂow rights prevails in these companies, which also threaten the interests of minority 
shareholders even though the ultimate owners are less powerful than in state-owned 
enterprises.
3.2. Investor Protection Regulations in China
With the development of the stock market, the Regulation on Pilot Project of 
Shareholding System and the Regulation on Listed Companies were published in 
1992. The regulations emphasize “one share, one vote” and stipulate various rights for 
shareholders. In the same year, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
was founded. In April 1993, the State Council issued its Provisional Regulations on 
the Administration of Share Issuance and Trading, which were the ﬁrst comprehensive 
MIN XIAO AND JIAXING YOU130
regulations on stock issuance and exchange in the People’s Republic of China.
To meet the demand for the development of a modern enterprise system, the 
Company Law was formally promulgated and came into force in July 1994. The law 
aimed at regulating ﬁrms’ operations to protect the legal rights and interests of their 
shareholders and creditors. It was the first national commercial law in the People’s 
Republic of China to include and included all of the important items on investor 
protection from prior regulations. In 1997, the Securities Law came into force, adjusting 
and supplementing some aspects of investor protection based on prior regulations and 
emphasizing the principles of openness, fairness, and impartiality in security issuance 
and dealing.
The Company Law and Securities Law laid a foundation for the legal system in 
the Chinese stock market. Following Western legislative experiences for reference, the 
Chinese government formulated or revised a number of other laws and regulations. 
Thus, a relatively complete system of investor protection was constructed in a short time. 
To meet the needs of the developing market, the two laws were revised in 2005. The 
new Company Law reﬂects the spirit of respecting the market mechanism and company 
self-regulation instead of over-regulation; it strengthens corporate governance and 
shareholder protection. The new Securities Law requires that intermediaries operate in 
the prescribed manner, deﬁnes the legal liability of civil aﬀairs related to securities, and 
stipulates more severe punishment for those who violate the law.   
   
3.3. Enforcement of Investor Protection in China 
Compared with the rapid development of the legal framework for investor 
protection, the enforcement environment has been a more difficult scenario. In the 
traditionally poor legal environment, the rules of investor protection have not suﬃciently 
taken eﬀect. Although the early chaos of the securities market has been eliminated, the 
expropriation of minority shareholder interest has not been abolished. 
In principle, civil liability, administrative liability and criminal liability exist to deter 
breaches of the law in relation to investor protection. Administrative liability is heavily 
emphasized in China, and criminal liability is infrequently triggered for securities issues. 
Civil liability, aimed at defending the civil rights and interests of victims, was incurred 
late in 2002, but diﬃculties remain in that area even today. 
Investor protection is enforced in two ways: administratively by the CSRC and 
legally through the local court system. Generally, the prosecution, investigation, 
punishment, and education conducted by the CSRC and its subsidiaries play an 
important role in deterring illegality and protecting minority shareholders. In 
contrast, legal redress is not eﬀective. It is diﬃcult for local courts to retain their 
independence because of their personnel and ﬁnancial reliance on local governments. 
The courts are open to government intervention and regional protectionism prevails 
in judicial practice, which increases the cost of law suits brought by minority 
shareholders. 
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3.4. Non-tradable Shares Reform and Overall Listing Program
To solve the institutional problem of split ownership, the Chinese government 
launched the Non-tradable Share Reform in May 2005. Non-tradable shareholders pay 
some “consideration” to tradable shareholders to exchange the rights of shares trading so 
that all the shares have equal rights. At the same time, the government began to promote 
an Overall Listing Program that required listed companies to stay independent of their 
controlling shareholders. A company that is about to go public should avoid spin oﬀs 
in the listing process, and a company that has listed should try to acquire its parent 
company. All listed companies are expected to be integrated and independent after 
the program so that the controlling shareholders’ motivation to expropriate is limited. 
Undoubtedly, the Non-tradable Share Reform and the Overall Listing Program together 
strengthen the alignment eﬀect and mitigate the entrenchment eﬀect of shareholding in 
Chinese listed companies.
4. Research Hypotheses
As discussed in the previous section, the legal protection of investors is well developed 
but the environment of enforcement is lagging in China. At present, the enforcement of 
investor protection is relative weak and public administration is stronger than the legal 
system. Nevertheless, the expropriation of minority shareholders by insiders is being held 
back to some extent by the Non-tradable Share Reform and the Overall Listing Program, 
and the environment is in the process of improving. 
Unlike in developed market economies with strong legal systems, there is wide 
within-country variation in the Chinese stock market because of diﬀerences in growth 
opportunities, control structures and investor protection for diﬀerent companies. This 
variation enables us to study the ﬁrm-level determinants of investor protection within 
one country. Firms with more complicated control structures tend to protect the private 
control beneﬁt instead of the interests of minority shareholders. Firms with more growth 
opportunities tend to increase the level of investor protection to lower the cost of capital 
and fund proﬁtable opportunities. Unlike in underdeveloped market economies with 
extremely poor legal systems, investors in China do not disregard the investor protection 
oﬀered by companies. If the legal system does not work at all, the individual contract is 
meaningless. In this circumstance, investor protection can neither increase the cost of 
theft nor lower the cost of capital by changing the expectations of minority investors. In 
China, the eﬀect of legal protection on investors is limited by a weak legal environment 
to some extent, but it is not impossible for companies to become creditable to outside 
investors through well-enforced investor protection.
It is obviously not suﬃcient for listed companies to simply set up investor protection 
mechanisms. Only when those mechanisms are put into practice can they be trusted 
by minority shareholders, which decreases the cost of capital. Overall, the relationship 
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between private control beneﬁts, growth opportunities, and investor protection predicted 
by our theoretical model should be tenable in China. However, it should be noted that 
what really works in the relationship may be the enforcement instead of the mechanisms 
of investor protection.
Based on the analysis of the theoretical model and the institution background, we 
present three hypotheses to be tested.
H1. The level of investor protection is negatively related to the opacity of the control 
structure, with the correlation more signiﬁcant for enforcement than for the mechanisms 
of investor protection under a relatively weak legal environment.
H2. The level of investor protection is positively related to growth opportunities, with the 
correlation more signiﬁcant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection 
under a relatively weak legal environment.
H3. More growth opportunities help to mitigate the negative correction between the 
level of investor protection and the opacity of control structure, with the inﬂuence more 
significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection under a 
relatively weak legal environment.
5. Data and Variables
5.1. Data
To meet the requirements of the Note for Special Activities on Enhancing the 
Governance Structure of Listed Companies (CSRC, companies, [2007]28), all 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are required to 
evaluate corporate governance by themselves according to related laws and regulations. 
By November 14, 2007, 1,432 companies had completed Self-Evaluation Reports. 
In the questionnaire on which the Report is based, the CSRC asks 100 questions on 
corporate governance, of which 22 are directly related to the legal protection oﬀered to 
minority shareholders. Replies to these questions provide valuable data for ﬁrm-level 
investor protection research. Given the importance placed on the survey by the CSRC, 
exchanges, and listed companies, it generates a much better response rate and better 
response quality than a typical questionnaire (Shen et al. 2009). It also provides the ﬁrst 
and most comprehensive dataset of cross-sectional investor protection information of 
Chinese listed companies in a uniform format.
Following Shen et al. (2009), we hand-collected the data on control right structures 
and investor protection from completed Self-Evaluation Reports, and obtained ﬁnancial 
and other data from the Wind database. To avoid bias in the research, we exclude the 
following: (1) ﬁrms with missing data in the Wind database; (2) ﬁrms listed after the end 
of 2006; (3) ﬁrms with missing information in the Self-Evaluation Report; (4) ﬁnancial 
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companies such as banks; (5) ﬁrms with extreme values out of the 1st-99th percentile of 
the variable distribution. We thus obtained 1029 sample companies (Table 1). 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure
Excluding 
procedure
Original 
sample
Excluding 
ﬁrms with 
missing data 
in the Wind 
database
Excluding 
ﬁrms listed 
after 2006
Excluding 
ﬁrms with 
incomplete 
information 
in Self-
Evaluation 
Reports
Excluding 
ﬁnancial 
companies
Excluding 
extreme 
values out 
of 1st-99th 
percentiles
Final sample
Sample 1,432 126 58 67 15 137 1,029
5.2. Variables
5.2.1. Dependant Variable: Investor Protection
The investor protection proposed by LLSV (1998) is described by legal origin and 
three measures, including shareholder rights, creditor rights, and enforcement. For 
shareholder protection, because shareholders exercise their power by voting for directors 
and voting on major corporate issues, LLSV focus on voting procedures in evaluating 
shareholder rights. Those rights encompass the “one share, one vote” principle, the 
“anti-director rights”, and the “bright-line rule”, which reﬂects the right to a mandatory 
dividend. Anti-director rights cover the following six areas: (1) voting by mail; (2) 
obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote; (3) minority representation on the 
board of directors through cumulative voting or proportional representation; (4) an 
oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; (5) preemptive 
rights to subscribe to new securities issues by the company; and (6) the right to call a 
special shareholder meeting. Djankov et al. (2008) revised the anti-director rights index 
by associating better investor protection with laws that are explicitly mandated, or set as 
default rules, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders. They revised index 
by retreating the enabling provisions while keeping the core of the six sub-indices. 
For enforcement, LLSV (1998) use ﬁve measures: eﬃciency of the judicial system, 
rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation by the government, and likelihood of 
contract repudiation by the government. In addition, because accounting plays a 
potentially crucial role in corporate governance, they use an estimate of the quality of 
the country’s accounting standards. Djankov et al. (2008) present a new and more direct 
measure of investor protection, the anti-self-dealing index, to reﬂect the legal protection 
of minority shareholders against self-interested related-party transactions. They describe 
a hypothetical self-dealing transaction and gathered from attorneys to survey in detail 
how each country’s legal system regulates that transaction. The new measures include 
private enforcement and public enforcement, where private enforcement is divided into 
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ex-ante and post-private control of self-dealing.
Following LLSV (1998), Shen et al. (2004) construct a Chinese time series investor-
protection regulation index to investigate investor protection within one country. They 
focus on 16 items associated with shareholder rights and other regulations of investor 
protection, and develop the index based on the Key Laws and Regulations Index in the 
Guide for Investor Protection Education issued by the CSRC. Jiang et al. (2008) develop 
a Chinese firm-level investor protection index using the Delphi method. They ask 
experts from both academic and practical area to determine the main items of investor 
protection and their weight. Considering the quality of ﬁnancial reports, related-party 
transaction, the amount of grabbing by controlling shareholders, proﬁtability, market 
return, potential proﬁtability, cash dividend, return of holding stocks, punishment by 
the CSRC, and criticism of the company by the CSRC or the exchanges, the indices 
include ﬁve measures: the right to know, the right to share beneﬁts equally, maximization 
of shareholder wealth, return on investment, and honesty of the company. Different 
from a typical investor protection index, this index is constructed from the perspective 
of all investors, rather than minority shareholders. 
Macro-level analysis, such as cross-country measures and time series indices of legal 
protection, might not be adequate for ﬁrm-level research. It is not easy to control other 
macro-level variables and distinguish the diﬀerence among individual companies when 
doing so. Although Jiang et al. (2008) make an eﬀort to solve this problem their index is 
too comprehensive for use with corporate governance. In line with LLSV (1998), Shen 
et al. (2004), and Djankov et al. (2008), Shen et al. (2009) develop a Chinese ﬁrm-level 
investor protection index by ﬁltering and classifying the replies associated with investor 
protection from the Self-Evaluation Report. However, of the 22 questions associated 
with investor protection in the Self-Evaluation Report, only 6, 7, 8, 4 companies replied 
with “No” for “violating the Rule on Shareholder’s Meeting of Listed Companies”, 
“insider control”, “information leaks,” and “insider trading,” respectively. The percentage 
of negative answers was too low (less than 1%) to be included in computing the index. 
Hence, we revised the index developed by Shen et al. (2009) by using the answers to the 
remaining 18 questions to obtain our investor protection composite index, IP_Comp 
(Table 2).3
3 To avoid possible bias, we still considered the answers to all 22 questions in the robustness test. Please see Shen 
et al. (2009) for detailed statistics information about of each item included in the investor protection index.
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Table 2. Firm-level Investor Protection Indices4
Index Questions Asked by the CSRC Score for the Reply
Anti-director rights
Have shareholders ever voted online except in the Non-
tradable Share Reform? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Has a proxy been used in shareholder meetings except in 
the Non-tradable Share Reform? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Has cumulative voting been used in voting for directors 
and supervisors? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Has a provisional shareholders’ meeting been requested by 
no less than 10% of shareholders? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Have provisional proposals been raised by no less than 3% 
shareholders? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Does the company have long-term mechanisms to prevent 
the grabbing of control by the controlling shareholder and 
its subsidiary enterprise?
1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Anti-director Rights Index (IP_Anti)5 The sum is distributed as [0, 6]
Disclosure
Has a disclosure system been established according to 
Rule on Listed Companies’ Information Disclosure? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Has a system been established for announcing, 
transferring, censoring and disclosing major issues? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Disclosure Index (IP_Disc) The sum is distributed as [0, 2]
Enforcement
Have any major issue been put into practice without/
before a resolution is passed at the shareholder meeting 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Have insiders bought or sold their own company’s shares 
illegally? 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Have company decisions been made independent of the 
controlling shareholder? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Have regular reports been issued on time? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Have any modiﬁed auditing opinions been issued on 
ﬁnancial reports? 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Has the company had to restate any ﬁnancial disclosure? 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Has the company been spot-inspected by regulators? 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Has the company had to rectify problems of disclosure or 
something else? 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Has the company been criticized, accused, or punished by 
exchanges for disclosure problems? 1 for “No”, 0 for “Yes”
Has the company disclosed information voluntarily? 1 for “Yes”, 0 for “No”
Enforcement Index (IP_Enfo) The sum is distributed as [0, 10]
Total Investor Protection Composite Index (IP_Comp) The sum is distributed as [0, 18]
4 We refer to Shen et al. (2009) to compute the investor protection indices in this table.
5 The answer “No” to some items in the anti-director section could indicate either no investor protection 
mechanism or no case to trigger the mechanism. To avoid possible bias, we thus eliminate these ambiguous 
items (provisional shareholders’ meeting, provisional proposal, and proxy) to reconstruct the anti-director index 
in the robustness test. 
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In China, legal rules of investor protection have been regulated gradually with the 
development of the stock market. However, enforcement improvement is lagging. In this 
context, it may be diﬃcult, if not impossible, for the investor protection mechanisms 
established by ﬁrms to be put into practice. Only when investor protection is brought 
into effect can firms restrain insider expropriation and obtain the trust of outside 
investors. We thus break the investor protection composite index IP_Comp into three: 
IP_Anti is an anti-director index, IP_Disc is a disclosure index, and IP_Enfo is an 
enforcement index of investor protection (Table 2). 
5.2.2. Independent Variables: Control Structure and Growth Opportunities
Following the methodology of Claessens et al. (2000), we hand-collected data on 
ultimate ownership held by controlling shareholders by tracing the pyramid and cross-
holding control chains disclosed in the Self-Evaluation Report. We deﬁne control rights 
(C) as minimal ownership in the control chain and cash ﬂow rights (O) as the product 
of the percentage in the control chain of the controlling shareholder (or the sum of the 
product, if there is more than one control chain for that shareholder). We then have the 
separation of control rights and cash ﬂow rights, C_O. Layer measures the number of 
layers in the control chain of the controlling shareholder. For instance, the Layer is 1 if B 
directly controls listed ﬁrm A and 2 if B controls A through C.
Tobin’s Q, market-book value ratio and sales growth are often used to measure 
growth opportunities. However, Tobin’s Q and the market-book value ratio are not 
adequate here because not all shares of Chinese listed ﬁrms were tradable before the end 
of 2006. We thus use the average annual sales growth rate in 2004-2006 as the proxy for 
the investment opportunity set, Inv_Oppo. As the rate of sales growth increases, so do a 
ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. In addition, following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998) and Durnev and Kim (2005), we estimate the external finance needed for 
growth, Ext_Fin, as the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s actual growth rate and internal 
growth rate. The actual growth rate is computed as a two-year average of the annual 
growth rate of total assets in 2005-2006, and the internal growth rate as a two-year 
average of (ROA×b)/(1-ROA×b).6 We assume that those ﬁrms with higher Ext_Fin have 
more investment opportunities and need more outside capital given internal ﬁnancial 
resources.
5.2.3. Control Variables
We control firm size, leverage, and the cash flow rights of the ultimate owner. 
Considering the relatively poor legal environment, prevailing government administration 
6 See Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998; p. 2111) for an elaboration of this measure. In our paper, Ext_Fin 
= actual growth rate - internal growth rate. In the formula for the internal growth rate, b is the proportion of 
the ﬁrm’s earnings retained for reinvestment. To avoid the inﬂuence of outliers, we set the actual growth rate as 
1 when it is more than 1.
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL, GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND  
INVESTOR PROTECTION 137
and the difference among firms with different controlling shareholders in control 
structure, the ability to finance and corporate governance in China, we divide our 
sample into four parts: ﬁrms controlled by private individuals, ﬁrms controlled by state-
owned enterprises, ﬁrms controlled by local government, and ﬁrms controlled by the 
central government. We use three dummies to control this difference: Corporation, 
Local_Gov, and Center_Gov (Table 3). 
Table 3. Deﬁnitions of Variables
Variables Symbol Deﬁnition
Control layers Layer Log of the control layers of the controlling shareholder
Separation of control and cash ﬂow 
rights of the controlling shareholder C_O 1 if control rights exceed cash ﬂow rights, 0 otherwise.
Investment opportunity set Inv_Oppo Average annual sales growth from 2004 to 2006
External funding needs Ext_Fin Diﬀerence between actual growth rate and internal growth rate
Size Size Log of assets at the end of 2006
Leverage Leverage Debt to equity ratio at the end of 2006
Cash ﬂow rights Ownership Cash ﬂow rights owned by controlling shareholder
Corporate-controlled company Corporation 1 if the controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise, 0 otherwise.
Local government-controlled company Local_Gov 1 if the controlling shareholder is a local SASAC, 0 otherwise.
Central government-controlled 
company Center_Gov
1 if the controlling shareholder is a SASAC of the state council, 
0 otherwise.
5.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that the investor protection composite 
index is from 5 to 16 with an average of 11.256. Speciﬁcally, the anti-director index, 
disclosure index, and enforcement index are distributed as [0, 5], [0, 2], and [2, 10], 
respectively. There is enough variation in the investor protection composite index, anti-
director index and enforcement index. In unreported descriptive statistics, all of the 
kurtosis and the skewness for these indices are close to zero. The disclosure indices for 
diﬀerent companies are slightly similar, which may have some negative inﬂuence on the 
following regression.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Average Median
Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
IP_Comp 11.256 11.000 1.861 5.000 16.000
IP_Anti 2.277 2.000 0.944 0.000 5.000
IP_Disc 1.932 2.000 0.267 0.000 2.000
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Average Median
Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
IP_Enfo 7.047 7.000 1.523 2.000 10.000
Layer 0.827 0.693 0.352 0.000 2.079
C_O 0.473 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Inv_Oppo 0.196 0.178 0.208 -0.797 0.986
Ext_Fin 0.073 0.045 0.145 -0.452 0.948
Size 21.473 21.346 1.165 18.157 29.647
Leverage 1.603 1.176 2.056 0.021 35.283
Ownership 0.309 0.288 0.164 0.010 0.821
Corporation 0.121 0.000 0.326 0.000 1.000
Local_Gov 0.431 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.000
Center_Gov 0.163 0.000 0.370 0.000 1.000
The correlation analysis in Table 5 shows that the investor protection composite 
index correlates with the anti-director index, the disclosure index, and the enforcement 
index at 53%, 28%, and 84%, respectively. It also correlates signiﬁcantly with the four 
explanatory variables, ie, control layers, the separation of control and cash ﬂow rights, 
investment opportunities, and external funding needs, at -6%, -6%, 19% and 18%, 
respectively. Speciﬁcally, the correlation of the enforcement index with the explanatory 
variables is more signiﬁcant than those of the anti-director index and disclosure index. 
Our hypotheses are preliminarily supported by the correlation analysis.
Table 5. Correlation Analysis
IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo Layer C_O Inv_Oppo Ext_Fin Size Leverage Ownership
IP_Comp 1 
IP_Anti 0.53*** 1 
IP_Disc 0.28*** 0.09*** 1 
IP_Enfo 0.84*** 0.01 0.11*** 1 
Layer -0.06** 0.01 -0.03 -0.08** 1 
C_O -0.06** 0.06** -0.05 -0.11*** 0.40*** 1 
Inv_Oppo 0.19*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.15*** -0.01 -0.01 1 
Ext_Fin 0.18*** 0.21*** -0.01 0.09*** -0.01 0.00 0.43*** 1 
Size 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.04 0.14*** 0.02 -0.11*** 0.14*** 0.30*** 1 
Leverage -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06* 0.26*** 0.41*** 1 
Ownership 0.11*** 0.00 0.03 0.13*** -0.15*** -0.49*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.23*** -0.05 1 
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level. 
6. Empirical Test and Results
6.1. Relation between Control Structure and Investor Protection
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In this section we turn to the regression analysis. To examine the relation between 
control structure and investor protection, we use all four indices of investor protection 
(IP_Comp, IP_Anti, IP_Disc, and IP_Enfo) as dependent variables and Layer and C_O 
as independent variables. The regression in Table 6 shows that the investor protection 
composite index, IP_Comp, is significantly negatively related to Layer and C_O. 
Generally, the level of investor protection is lower for companies with more complicated 
control structures. However, the significantly negative relation between investor 
protection and control structure exists only for the enforcement index and not for the 
anti-director and disclosure indices. Therefore, our results are supportive of H1. Control 
structure opacity facilitates the acquirement of private beneﬁt of control and discourages 
the improvement of investor protection. In China, the negative correlation is more likely 
to exist for the quality of enforcement than for the establishment of mechanisms of 
investor protection due to the relatively weak legal environment.
Table 6. Control Structure and Investor Protection
IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo
Intercept
3.608*** -0.961 1.698*** 2.871*** 3.344*** -0.994* 1.687*** 2.652***
(3.06) (-1.58) (9.75) (2.96) (2.85) (-1.65) (9.75) (2.74)
Layer
-0.374** 0.018 -0.022 -0.370***
(-2.23) (0.21) (-0.89) (-2.67)
C_O
-0.127 0.137* -0.019 -0.245**
(-0.92) (1.92) (-0.93) (-2.14)
Size
0.373*** 0.159*** 0.012 0.202*** 0.376*** 0.155*** 0.012 0.209***
(6.54) (5.42) (1.40) (4.30) (6.56) (5.25) (1.46) (4.42)
Leverage
-0.123*** -0.041*** -0.007 -0.076*** -0.124*** -0.040*** -0.007 -0.077***
(-4.04) (-2.60) (-1.45) (-3.02) (-4.04) (-2.52) (-1.48) (-3.06)
Ownership
0.505 -0.168 -0.010 0.683** 0.529 -0.022 -0.021 0.572*
(1.29) (-0.83) (-0.17) (2.11) (1.27) (-0.10) (-0.35) (1.67)
Corporation
0.167 -0.137 -0.007 0.311* 0.134 -0.110 -0.011 0.255
(0.85) (-1.34) (-0.25) (1.91) (0.67) (-1.07) (-0.39) (1.56)
Local_Gov
-0.137 -0.111 0.029 -0.055 -0.199 -0.055 0.021 -0.165
(-0.91) (-1.44) (1.33) (-0.45) (-1.24) (-0.66) (0.89) (-1.25)
Center_Gov
0.171 -0.116 0.009 0.277* 0.034 -0.070 -0.003 0.107
(0.87) (-1.14) (0.30) (1.71) (0.17) (-0.69) (-0.09) (0.66)
Adj.R2 5.66% 2.28% 0.08% 4.52% 5.28% 2.63% 0.09% 4.28%
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level; t statistics are shown 
in parentheses. 
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6.2. Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection
Using the indices of investor protection (IP_Comp, IP_Anti, IP_Disc, and IP_Enfo) 
as dependent variables and the investment opportunities set (Inv_Oppo) and external 
funding needs (Ext_Fin) as independent variables, we estimate a regression to explore 
the relation between growth opportunities and investor protection.
Table 7. Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection
IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo
Intercept
3.752*** -0.766 1.677*** 2.841*** 4.488*** -0.206 1.663*** 3.031***
(3.23) (-1.27) (9.67) (2.95) (3.80) (-0.34) (9.43) (3.08)
Inv_Oppo
1.492*** 0.594*** -0.010 0.908***
(5.49) (4.22) (-0.25) (4.03)
Ext_Fin
2.112*** 1.315*** -0.030 0.828**
(5.16) (6.27) (-0.50) (2.43)
Size
0.338*** 0.146*** 0.012 0.180*** 0.310*** 0.121*** 0.013 0.176***
(5.96) (4.98) (1.40) (3.82) (5.37) (4.10) (1.46) (3.67)
Leverage
-0.124*** -0.041*** -0.007 -0.076*** -0.147*** -0.056*** -0.006 -0.085***
(-4.11) (-2.66) (-1.44) (-3.03) (-4.81) (-3.59) (-1.35) (-3.32)
Ownership
0.519 -0.238 0.001 0.755** 0.674* -0.176 0.000 0.849***
(1.36) (-1.20) (0.02) (2.38) (1.77) (-0.90) (0.01) (2.67)
Corporation
0.205 -0.118 -0.008 0.331** 0.200 -0.111 -0.008 0.319*
(1.05) (-1.17) (-0.28) (2.05) (1.02) (-1.11) (-0.28) (1.96)
Local_Gov
-0.084 -0.086 0.028 -0.027 -0.109 -0.087 0.028 -0.050
(-0.57) (-1.12) (1.28) (-0.22) (-0.73) (-1.15) (1.28) (-0.40)
Center_Gov
0.066 -0.114 0.003 0.176 0.063 -0.117 0.003 0.177
(0.35) (-1.16) (0.11) (1.12) (0.33) (-1.20) (0.11) (1.12)
Adj. R2 7.92% 3.96% 0.01% 5.35% 7.61% 5.91% 0.03% 4.40%
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level; t statistics are shown 
in parentheses.  
The regression results in Table 7 indicate that the investor protection composite 
index increases signiﬁcantly with both investment opportunities and external funding 
needs. Speciﬁcally, this relation exists for the anti-director index and the enforcement 
index rather than the disclosure index. The results thus support H2. More investment 
opportunities and more outside capital are needed motivate the controlling shareholder 
to protect investors better so that the company can finance profitable opportunities 
with a lower cost of capital. In this way, the controlling shareholder can obtain more 
shared beneﬁt. Given the relatively ineﬀective legal institutions in China, the positive 
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correlation between growth opportunities and investor protection is more likely to exist 
for the quality of enforcement than for the establishment of mechanisms of investor 
protection.
6.3. Control Structure, Growth Opportunities, and Investor Protection
Given that the level of investor protection decreases with the opacity of the control 
structure and increases with growth opportunities, how would investor protection fare if 
the two determinants combined? To consider this situation we introduce the interaction 
terms of control structure and growth opportunities into the regression. In the left sides 
of Tables 8 and 9, the results reveal that the coeﬃcients of Layer are negative and those 
of the interaction terms of Layer and Inv_Oppo and Layer and Ext_Fin are positive. All 
are statistically significant except in the regression of the anti-director index and the 
disclosure index. The right sides of Tables 8 and 9 show that except for the anti-director 
index, the level of investor protection increases with the decrease in C_O and with the 
interaction term of C_O and growth opportunities. However, only the coeﬃcients in the 
regression of the investor protection composite index and the enforcement index are all 
statistically signiﬁcant. These results are supportive of H3. More growth opportunities 
help to mitigate the negative correlation between the opacity of the control structure and 
the level of investor protection, but the eﬀect is associated more with enforcement rather 
than the mechanisms of investor protection. 
Table 8. Control Structure, Investment Opportunity Set and Investor Protection
IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo
Intercept
4.186*** -0.724 1.703*** 3.207*** 3.501*** -0.952 1.683*** 2.770***
(3.57) (-1.19) (9.73) (3.30) (3.00) (-1.58) (9.72 (2.88)
Layer
-0.622*** -0.084 -0.024 -0.514***
(-3.58) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-3.57)
Layer× 
Inv_Oppo
1.456*** 0.597*** 0.013 0.846***
(4.89) (3.87) (0.29) (3.43)
C_O
-0.436*** 0.052 -0.012 -0.477***
(-2.78) (0.65) (-0.49) (-3.69)
C_O× 
Inv_Oppo
1.509*** 0.411** -0.037 1.135***
(4.10) (2.16) (-0.68) (3.74)
Size
0.346*** 0.149*** 0.012 0.186*** 0.371*** 0.153*** 0.012 0.205***
(6.11) (5.06) (1.36) (3.97) (6.51) (5.21) (1.47) (4.36)
Leverage
-0.126*** -0.042*** -0.007* -0.078*** -0.128*** -0.041*** -0.007 -0.080***
(-4.19) (-2.69) (-1.46) (-3.10) (-4.21) (-2.60) (-1.46) (-3.21)
Ownership
0.390 -0.215 -0.011 0.616* 0.447 -0.045 -0.019 0.511
(1.00) (-1.07) (-0.18) (1.91) (1.08) (-0.21) (-0.31) (1.50)
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IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo
Corporation
0.176 -0.133 -0.007 0.316* 0.154 -0.105 -0.012 0.270*
(0.90) (-1.32) (-0.25) (1.96) (0.78) (-1.02) (-0.40) (1.66)
Local_Gov
-0.112 -0.101 0.030 -0.041 -0.202 -0.056 0.021 -0.168
(-0.76) (-1.32) (1.34) (-0.33) (-1.27) (-0.68) (0.89) (-1.28)
Center_Gov
0.128 -0.133 0.008 0.253 0.108 -0.075 -0.002 0.095
(0.66) (-1.32) (0.29) (1.57) (0.09) (-0.74) (-0.08) (0.59)
Adj. R2 7.73% 3.60% 0.00% 5.51% 6.73% 2.98% 0.03% 5.48%
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level; t statistics are shown 
in parentheses. 
Table 9. Control Structure, External Funding Needs, and Investor Protection
IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo IP_Comp IP_Anti IP_Disc IP_Enfo
Intercept 4.661*** -0.364 1.689*** 3.336*** 4.110*** -0.656 1.695*** 3.072***
(3.95) (-0.60) (9.56) (3.40) (3.52) (-1.09) (9.72) (3.17)
Layer -0.473*** -0.038 -0.021 -0.413***
(-2.84) (-0.44) (-0.85) (-2.98)
layer×
Inv_Oppo
2.370*** 1.344*** -0.020 1.046***
(5.29) (5.83) (-0.30) (2.81)
C_O -0.357** 0.035 -0.021 -0.371***
(-2.50) (0.48) (-1.00) (-3.12)
C_O× 
Inv_Oppo
3.096*** 1.367*** 0.032 1.697***
(5.43) (4.64) (0.38) (3.59)
Size 0.323*** 0.131*** 0.012 0.180*** 0.341*** 0.139*** 0.012 0.189***
(5.66) (4.46) (1.42) (3.79) (5.99) (4.75) (1.40) (4.01)
Leverage -0.150*** -0.056*** -0.006 -0.088*** -0.141*** -0.047*** -0.007 -0.087***
(-4.91) (-3.56) (-1.39) (-3.45) (-4.64) (-3.03) (-1.51) (-3.44)
Ownership 0.532 -0.153 -0.010 0.695* 0.594 0.007 -0.021 0.608*
(1.37) (-0.77) (-0.17) (2.16) (1.45) (0.03) (-0.33) (1.78)
Corporation 0.169 -0.135 -0.007 0.312* 0.156 -0.100 -0.011 0.268
(0.87) (-1.35) (-0.25) (1.93) (0.80) (-0.99) (-0.38) (1.64)
Local_Gov -0.120 -0.102 0.029 -0.048 -0.206 -0.058 0.021 -0.169
(-0.81) (-1.33) (1.32) (-0.39) (-1.30) (-0.71) (0.89) (-1.29)
Center_Gov 0.119 -0.145 0.009 0.255 0.006 -0.083 -0.003 0.092
(0.61) (-1.45) (0.32) (1.57) (0.03) (-0.83) (-0.10) (0.57)
Adj. R2 0.081 0.053 0.000 0.052 7.85% 4.55% 0.00% 5.38%
Note: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level; t statistics are shown 
in parentheses.
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6.4. Robustness Test
To examine the robustness of the abovementioned results, we reconsider the investor 
protection index by eliminating the items with some ambiguity in computing the anti-
director index, keeping the four items with little variation in the enforcement index and 
combining the anti-director and disclosure indices into an establishment index. Using 
these new indices, our main results remain unchanged.
In addition, we replace the average annual sales growth rate and external funding 
needs with the market-book value of equity in 2006 as a proxy of growth opportunities 
and rerun the regressions employed in Tables 6 to 9. The results show that the 
coeﬃcients remain unchanged in sign and become even more statistically signiﬁcant.
7. Conclusion
In the law and finance literature, ample studies use the index of investor legal 
protection developed by LLSV to explore the economic consequences of investor 
protection. We argue, however, that it may not make sense to take firm-level 
homogeneity and exogenousity for grunted. The level of legal protection for investors 
at the firm level may not only be heterogeneous but may also be endogenous even 
under identical legal environments. It is thus important to explore ﬁrm-level investor 
protection and its determinants. 
We have developed a theoretic model to illustrate how the controlling shareholder 
chooses the level of investor protection to pursue their own interests. Investor protection 
limits the controlling shareholder’s acquisition of private control benefit, and at the 
same time helps to improve that shareholder’s shared beneﬁt. Controlling shareholders 
thus make decisions by trading oﬀ the losses and gains resulted from improvements in 
investor protection. If the control structure of a company is complicated, the controlling 
shareholder can easily extract the private beneﬁt of control. He is reluctant to enhance 
investor protection because his private benefit would be reduced greatly due to the 
required transparency. In contrast, if a company has good growth opportunities and is 
thus in need of external ﬁnancing, investor protection would help the company to fund 
proﬁtable opportunities with a lower cost of capital. Hence, the controlling shareholder 
would be willing to improve investor protection in that his shared beneﬁt would increase 
with the increase in the entire equity. 
We use a measure of firm-level investor protection and examine the relationship 
between control structure, growth opportunities, and investor protection. Empirical 
evidence supports our theoretical prediction. Generally, the level of investor protection 
improves with a decrease in the opacity of the control structure and an increase in 
growth opportunities. Furthermore, better investment opportunities mitigate the 
negative correlation between investor protection and control structure opacity. Dividing 
the composite index of investor protection into three parts, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients 
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in the regression of the enforcement index are the most significant and those in the 
regression of the anti-director and disclosure indices unstable in their signiﬁcance. It 
seems insufficient to simply set up mechanisms of investor protection in a relatively 
weak legal environment. Provided that the performance of an individual contract cannot 
be ensured, it is diﬃcult for a company’s mechanisms to increase an insider’s cost of 
theft and lower the cost of capital. Thus, only the quality of the enforcement of investor 
protection is signiﬁcant.
Our empirical study is based on the open replies of Chinese listed companies to 
questions associated with investor protection asked by the CSRC. These unique data 
provide us with insight into ﬁrm-level investor protection within one country. However, 
the survey is not conducted regularly, which makes longitudinal research diﬃcult. In 
addition, even though each listed company should be open in its replies to the survey 
because it bears the legal liability to tell the truth, the information is inevitably not 
ﬂawless. Finally, although we use the lagged value of independent variables to explain the 
level of investor protection in 2007 to mitigate reverse causality, we have not thoroughly 
solved this problem. How to obtain better data and eliminate reverse causality are thus 
avenues for further research. It will also be necessary to do further work to grasp the 
intrinsic factors that affect corporate policy choices and find a way to compel listed 
companies to improve the quality of their investor protection, especially in transition 
economies. 
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